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Abstract There is a debate in the literature about the arguments of utility in expected
utility theory. Some implicitly assume utility is defined on final wealth whereas oth-
ers argue it may be defined on initial wealth and income separately. I argue that
making income and wealth separate arguments of utility has important implications
that may not be widely recognized. A framework is presented that allows the uni-
fied treatment of expected utility models and anomalies. I show that expected utility
of income models can predict framing induced preference reversals, a willingness
to pay-willingness to accept gap for lotteries, and choice-value preference rever-
sals. The main contribution is a theorem. It is proved that for all utility functions
where initial wealth and income enter separately, either there will be preference
reversals or preferences can be represented by a utility function defined on final
wealth alone.
Keywords Expected utility theory · Risk aversion · Preference reversals
JEL Classification C90 · D81
Expected utility theory (EUT) has remained the standard theory of choice used in
economics. One of the appealing features of the theory is that risk aversion can be
modeled using a concave utility function. Rabin (2000), however, has argued that a
concave utility function cannot accommodate risk aversion over modest stakes with-
out predicting implausible degrees of risk aversion over large stakes. If we accept this
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argument, risk aversion over small stakes is an anomaly for the theory. This paper
aims to clarify the implications of Rabin’s paradox and different ways of defining
utility in EUT.
The implications of Rabin’s paradox have been debated in the literature. The para-
dox depends on the assumption that utility is defined on wealth but von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1947) did not specify the domain of the utility function when
they developed EUT. Cox and Sadiraj (2006) argue that utility can be defined on
wealth or income and show that an expected utility of income model can explain risk
aversion over small and large stakes.1 Accordingly, they write: “the type of global
small-stakes risk aversion assumed in previous literature (Rabin 2000; Rabin and
Thaler 2001) has no implication for the expected utility of income model, hence no
general implication for expected utility theory”. Rubinstein (2006) makes a similar
argument, also pointing out that Rabin’s Paradox can be avoided by allowing util-
ity to be defined on changes in wealth.2 In contrast, Wakker (2005, 2010) argues
that expected utility of income models are reference dependent like prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Schmidt et al. 2008),
and hence a major breakaway from the standard rational model. Empirical studies,
however, typically do find risk aversion over modest stakes and it is commonly
described using expected utility of income models. Some examples from the recent li-
terature are Holt and Laury (2002), Harrison et al. (2007), and Andersen et al. (2008).
In this paper, I examine some consequences of defining utility on either income
or initial wealth and income, rather than final wealth alone. The paper makes several
contributions to the literature: a framework for describing expected utility models and
preference reversals, a series of illustrations of preference reversals with expected
utility of income models, and a theorem. I argue that whether or not income is an
argument of utility has important consequences. If it is, then preferences are reference
point dependent, since how outcomes are evaluated depends on what is counted as
income and what is counted as wealth. The consequence of this reference dependence
is that expected utility of income models can predict patterns of behavior usually
thought of as anomalies for standard theory.
The framework to describe decision problems and expected utility models is devel-
oped in Section 1. It is based on the framework of states of the world, consequences
and acts introduced by Savage (1954) and adapted by Sugden (2003). Preferences are
defined over acts. Acts are also used to define what is counted as initial wealth and
what is counted as income. The framework is also used to define different types of
anomaly allowing the unified treatment of a range of anomalies.
1Other authors have also presented expected utility models that are explicitly not defined on wealth alone.
An early example is Markowitz (1952) and a more recent one Sugden (2003).
2Another response to Rabin’s paradox is the argument that other theories are vulnerable to analogous
calibrations, so calibration may be a problem for all decision theories, not just expected utility of final
wealth. Cox and Sadiraj (2006) present a concavity calibration proposition for small and large stake
risk aversion that applies to expected utility of income models and some non-expected utility theories.
Rubinstein (2006) considers time preferences and presents a calibration showing how constant discounting
and seemingly plausible inter-day discounting predict implausible degrees of discounting over longer
periods.
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Different types of reference point effect can occur with expected utility of income
models. In Section 2, a number of examples are presented, adapting several pre-
viously reported results. First, certain models predict framing induced preference
reversals. This occurs when changing the reference point changes the preference
order of two options. Changing the reference point can be compared to changing
the perspective on a visual scene. A framing induced preference reversal is like
changing the position from which two mountains are viewed changing which one
appears highest.3 Second, the models can predict a willingness to pay-willingness
to accept gap for lotteries. That is, the maximum amount a person would be willing
to pay to obtain a lottery is less than the minimum they would be willing to accept
to give it up had they owned it. Third, the models can predict choice-value prefer-
ence reversals. These occur when one of a pair of lotteries is chosen in a straight
choice but the other is valued higher when certainty equivalents of the two lotteries
are elicited.
One might wonder if these preference reversals only occur with certain utility
functions or assumptions about how outcomes are coded in terms of initial wealth
and income. The main contribution of this paper is a theorem, which is presented
in Section 3. It is proved that for all utility functions defined on income or initial
wealth and income, there will be framing induced preference reversals unless the
preferences can be described by a utility function defined on final wealth alone.
The intuition for the proof is that changing the reference point never changes pref-
erences if and only if an expected utility of final wealth model can represent the
preferences. The wider implications for decision theory are discussed in Section 4.
One important implication is that since empirical studies typically do find risk aver-
sion over modest stakes, the possibility of preference reversals occurring should
be taken seriously when modeling individual behavior and strategic interactions
between agents.
1 Framework
A framework based on the one developed by Savage (1954) and adapted by Sugden
(2003) is used to describe expected utility models, decision problems, and anomalies.
There is a set, S, of mutually exclusive states of the world. States represent different
resolutions of uncertainty. The number of states is finite. The probability of state s
obtaining is p(s) where p : S → [0, 1]. For all s ∈ S, p(s) > 0. An act, a is a
function mapping from S to consequences C, a : S → C. The set of all possible
acts is denoted by A. A special case is a constant act. It gives the same consequence
in all states of the world, that is for all s, s′ ∈ S, a(s) = a(s′), and represents a
sure amount. Acts serve two purposes in the framework. First, acts are the objects of
choice. Second, acts are used to define the initial wealth of a decision maker and so
determine what part of the outcome is counted as income.
3This analogy was introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1981).
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In this paper consequences are restricted to levels of wealth. Let Cw = {w ∈ R :
w ≥ 0} be a set of non negative real numbers representing wealth levels.
Definition 1 A utility of final wealth function is uw : Cw → R where for all
w,w′ ∈ Cw, if w > w′ then uw(w) > uw(w′). The set of all such functions is
denoted Uw.
The utility functions in Uw can be used to construct corresponding expected utility
models.
EUw(a) =
∑
s∈S
p(s)uw(a(s))
Act a is preferred to act b if and only if EUw(a) > EUw(b). Preference is a binary
relation between a and b.
To model utility of income, final wealth w is disaggregated into initial wealth r
and income y. Let Dy = {y ∈ R : r ≥ 0 ∧ (r + y) ∈ Cw}.
Definition 2 A utility of income function is uy : Dy → R where for all y, y′ ∈ Dy ,
if y > y′ then uy(y) > uy(y′). The set of all such functions is denoted Uy .
To model expected utility of initial wealth and income, let a set of ordered initial
wealth-income pairs Dry = {(r, y) ∈ R2 : r ≥ 0 ∧ (r + y) ∈ Cw}.
Definition 3 A utility of initial wealth and income function is ury : Dry → R
where for all (r, y), (r ′, y′) ∈ Dry , if r = r ′ and y > y′ then ury(r, y) > ury(r ′, y′).
The set of all such functions is denoted Ury .
An act a gives final wealth in each state of the world. Income, y is the difference
between initial and final wealth. Let initial wealth be defined by the act r. Income in
state s is a(s) − r(s).
When r is a constant act, expected utility of income for utility function uy is
defined as follows.
EUy(r, a) =
∑
s∈S
p(s)uy(a(s) − r(s))
Expected utility of initial wealth and income for utility function ury is defined in
a similar way.
EUry(r, a) =
∑
s∈S
p(s)ury(r(s), a(s) − r(s))
For both EUy and EUry models, when initial wealth is given by act r, act a is
preferred to act b if and only if EU(r, a) > EU(r, b). When a set of options is
compared, the same act r defining initial wealth is used for all the options. Preference
is a triadic relation between a, b, and r.
The framework allows initial wealth to be uncertain. When r is not a constant
act, there are a number of ways expected utility of income and expected utility of
initial wealth and income can be modeled. A simple approach is a state-by-state
J Risk Uncertain (2013) 46:175–189 179
comparison of r and a with EUy(r, a) and EUry(r, a) defined by the equations
above.4
The framework and the differences between the three expected utility models can
be illustrated using game of roulette. An American roulette wheel has 38 numbered
pockets where the ball can land. When a player bets on a single number, they receive
36 times the stake if the ball lands on the number and zero otherwise. Suppose the
player has a certain initial wealth of $100 when entering the casino. This can be
represented by the constant act w100. The set of states of the world contains one
state for each pocket. The set of acts that are chosen between are the admissible
bets. The act of betting one dollar on number 8, denoted b8, gives the consequence
of $100 − $1 + $36 = $135 if the ball lands on number 8 and $100 − $1 = $99
otherwise. The expected utility of placing the bet in each of the three models is given
by the following equations.
EUw(b8) = 138uw(135) +
37
38
uw(99)
EUy(w100, b8) = 138uy(135 − 100) +
37
38
uy(99 − 100)
EUry(w100, b8) = 138ury(100, 135 − 100) +
37
38
ury(100, 99 − 100)
Notice that although the utility functions uy and ury take income as an argument,
EUy and EUry take acts as arguments and acts always map from S to Cw.
The example can be extended to illustrate using an uncertain act to define initial
wealth. Suppose one dollar has been bet on 8 but the roulette wheel has not been spun
yet and the player considers placing an additional dollar bet on 8, denoted by the act
b′8. The act b8 could be taken as the initial wealth, in which case the expected utility
of wealth and income using the state-by-state approach would be as follows.
EUry(b8, b′8) =
1
38
ury(135, 170 − 135) + 3738ury(99, 98 − 99)
The extended example can also illustrate the difficulties inherent in deciding
which consequences are initial wealth. An alternative act (either constant or uncer-
tain) could be taken as the initial wealth which could give rise to different decisions.
For instance, if act w100 defined initial wealth, the expected utility from betting an
extra dollar on number 8 would be EUry(w100, b′8) rather than EUry(b8, b
′
8).
Preference reversals resulting from changing the initial wealth can be defined as
follows.
Definition 4 A framinginducedpreferencereversaloccurs if thereexist r, rˆ, a, b ∈
A such that
EU(r, a) > EU(r, b)
4In Section 2.2 the state-by-state approach is compared to an approach similar to that taken by Koszegi
and Rabin (2007).
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but
EU(rˆ, a) ≤ EU(rˆ, b).
This definition is used in the following section and in the theorem reported in
Section 3. Two additional types of preference reversal, reference-dependent-
valuations and choice-valuation preference reversals, are also defined and discussed
in the next section.
2 Anomalies under expected utility of income models
Expected utility of income models can predict preference reversals. This is illustrated
with the following utility function, where y is income in dollars (i.e. losses or gains
in wealth).
uy(y) =
{
0.9y + 0.1 y < 1
y0.9 y ≥ 1 (1)
This utility function was proposed by Cox and Sadiraj to show that an expected
utility of income model can explain risk aversion over modest stakes without imply-
ing absurd risk aversion over large stakes.5 Notice that although the function is
defined on losses and gains like prospect theory’s value function, there is no kink
at the origin.
2.1 Framing induced preference reversals
Expected utility of income models can predict framing induced preference reversals.
That is, for some utility functions defined on income, changing how outcomes are
coded in terms of initial wealth and income changes preferences. Table 1 shows two
examples illustrating this. The first example is shown in the top section of the table.
With initial wealth $200, an expected utility of income maximizer whose preferences
are described by Eq. 1 prefers A to B. With initial wealth $400, they prefer D to C.
Notice, however, that option A gives the same final wealth as C; B gives the same as
D. Changing the initial wealth from $200 to $400 has reversed their preference over
the two outcomes defined in terms of final wealth.6
5The potential for anomalies does not go unnoticed by Cox and Sadiraj. For instance in their footnote 8
they write that the expected utility of initial wealth and income model they introduce “does not rule out
certain types of anomalies (see Rubinstein 2006 for an illustration). Detailed analysis of possible “money
pump” preference cycles and other violations of full rationality are beyond the scope of the present paper,
which is concerned with the implications of concavity calibration for decision theories.”
6This example is a slight modification of one Kahneman and Tversky (1982) use. It shows how the same
decision problem can be framed in different ways and how different frames can lead people to choose
different options.
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Table 1 Framing induced preference reversals
Initial Option Income Expected Final
Wealth Utility Wealth
Utility function: Equation 1
$200 A $49 33.2 $249
$200 B ($200, .25; $0, .75) 29.5 ($400, .25; $200, .75)
$400 C −$151 −135.8 $249
$400 D ( $0, .25; −$200, .75) −134.9 ($400, .25; $200, .75)
Utility function: Equation 2
$50 E $180 25.0 $230
$50 F ($350, .25; $150, .75) 25.1 ($400, .25; $200, .75)
$150 G $80 17.6 $230
$150 H ($250, .25; $50, .75) 17.2 ($400, .25; $200, .75)
In the “Income” and “Final Wealth” columns, lotteries are described as a series of prize-probability pairs.
For example, ($200, .25; $0, .75) means $200 with probability .25 and zero with probability .75. For sure
amounts, probability values are omitted. In the top section of the table, the expected utility values are
calculated using Eq. 1 as the utility function; in the bottom section, they are calculated using Eq. 2
Framing induced preference reversals can occur even when all the outcomes being
evaluated are above the initial wealth. This is illustrated in a second example that
uses the following utility function.
uy(y) = 1 − exp(−αy
1−β)
α
(2)
This function was used by Holt and Laury (2002) as part of a stochastic choice
model. Using data from a lottery-choice experiment they estimated the two param-
eters as α = 0.029 and β = 0.269. The example, using the utility function and
estimated parameters, is shown in the bottom section of the table. With initial wealth
$50, the risky option F is preferred to the safe option E. With initial wealth $150, the
safe option G is preferred to the risky option H.
2.2 Reference-dependent valuations
The framework can be used to describe reference dependent valuations for lotteries.
Definition 5 Valuations are reference dependent if there exist r, rˆ, a, v, v ∈ A such
that
EU(r, a) = EU(r, v)
and
EU(rˆ, a) = EU(rˆ, v)
but for all s ∈ S, v(s) ≥ v(s) and for some s ∈ S, v(s) > v(s).
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Reference dependent valuations are usually thought of as an anomaly for standard
theory. For instance, List (2003) writes:
the basic independence assumption, which is used in most theoretical and
applied economic models to assess the operation of markets, has been directly
refuted in several experimental settings [Knetsch 1989; Kahneman et al. 1990;
Bateman et al. 1997]. These experimental findings have been robust across
unfamiliar goods, such as irradiated sandwiches, and common goods, such as
chocolate bars, with most authors noting behavior consistent with an endow-
ment effect. Such findings have induced even the most ardent supporters
of neoclassical theory to doubt the validity of certain neoclassical modeling
assumptions.
Although the endowment effect is commonly thought of as a phenomenon in riskless
choice, it can also occur in risky settings. There are several ways specific measures
of value can be defined. I focus on four measures Bateman et al. (1997) define, and
apply them to a choice between a binary lottery and a sure amount. Some pairs of
measures can be used to identify reference dependence as defined in Definition 5.
For simplicity, it is assumed there is no background risk.7 Let w be a constant act that
gives x in every state. Let b be an act representing playing the lottery. It gives x +
prize where prize is the lottery payout in the state. For each of the cases below, the
valuation measure is the amount of money that makes a person indifferent between
the two options. For two of the measures, initial wealth is the lottery b and for two
it is the constant act w. In some cases, an amount is added or subtracted from one of
the acts. For example, b − WT P means the consequence in state s is b(s) − WT P .
Willingness to accept (WT A): A person is endowed with b and is indifferent
between (a) selling b for WT A or (b) keeping b.
EU(b, b) = EU(b, w + WT A)
Willingness to pay (WT P ): A person is indifferent between (a) buying b for
WT P or (b) not trading.
EU(w, w) = EU(w, b − WT P)
Equivalent gain (EG): A person is indifferent between (a) gaining b or (b)
gaining EG.
EU(w, b) = EU(w, w + EG)
Equivalent loss (EL): A person is endowed with b and is indifferent between (a)
giving up b or (b) giving up EL.
EU(b, w) = EU(b, b − EL)
7It would be a simple extension to include an act representing background risk.
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Bateman et al. (1997) argue that the standard theory while not predicting equality
between WT A and WT P does predict EG = WT A and EL = WT P . Under
reference dependent preferences, they write:
If losses loom larger than gains, then, in the absence of income effects, we
should expect WT A to be greater than WT P . EG, which expresses an equiv-
alence between gains on the two dimensions, and EL which expresses an
equivalence between losses, should be expected to take values intermediate
between WT P and WT A.
The same result holds when Definition 5 is used to identify reference dependence.
Valuations are reference dependent if EG 	= WT P or EL 	= WT A. Table 2 shows
WT A, WT P , EG and EL valuations for a binary lottery that pays out $1000 with
probability 0.3 and zero otherwise. There are several ways income could be measured
when an agent holds a risky position. The framework described in Section 1 is used to
describe two alternative approaches. Figures calculated using these two approaches
are shown in the table.
First a state-by-state comparison as used by Sugden (2003), which was introduced
earlier. For each state of the world, the consequence of the act a is compared to the
consequence of the reference act r in that state.
EU(r, a) =
∑
s∈S
p(s)uy(a(s) − r(s)) (3)
Second, an approach similar to that taken by Koszegi and Rabin (2007).8 For each
state of the world, the consequence of the act a is compared to the consequence of
the reference act r in every state.
EU(r, a) =
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈S
p(s)p(t)uy(a(s) − r(t)) (4)
Notice that when r is a constant act, the two approaches are equivalent, and so
both are consistent with the definition of expected utility of initial wealth and income
in Section 1.
The four value measures are calculated using the utility of income function uy
defined in Eq. 1. Notice that (a) WT A exceeds WT P and (b) both EG 	= WT A and
EL 	= WT P . This holds for both specifications of the reference point. The initial
wealth is a sure amount for EG and WT P so (when there is no background risk)
the state-by-state and the Koszegi-Rabin approaches give the same result. When the
initial wealth is the lottery, the two approaches give different results. For the state-by-
state approach, WT A exceeds expected value (the lottery’s expected value is 300).
For the Koszegi-Rabin approach, all measures are less than expected value.
Consider the consequences of the differences in the valuations for a variant of
Knetsch’s 1989 chocolate and mugs experiment. Suppose a person with preferences
8Other aspects of Koszegi and Rabin’s model (such as separating standard consumption utility and loss
gain utility and making the reference point a person’s recent rational expectations about outcomes) are not
used in this paper.
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Table 2 Reference dependent valuations
Measure State-by-state Koszegi-Rabin
Willingness to accept (WTA) $413.4 $278.6
Equivalent loss (EL) $300.0 $230.8
Equivalent gain (EG) $262.6 $262.6
Willingness to pay (WTP) $196.1 $196.1
The table shows valuations for the same lottery calculated using the four measures and the two approaches
described in this section. The valuations are for a lottery that pays out $1000 with probability 0.3 and zero
otherwise.
as in Table 2 is given the lottery and then asked if they want to swap it for $250.
For the lottery WT A > 250 so the trade will be refused. Now suppose instead the
person had been endowed with 250 and asked if they want to swap it for the lot-
tery. For the lottery WT P < 250 so the trade will be refused. There would be an
endowment effect.
2.3 Choice-valuation preference reversals
Standard economic theory implies that the preference ordering of a pair of alterna-
tives should not depend on the process used to elicit it. There is a large body of
evidence, however, suggesting that for certain classes of lottery, the process used to
elicit preferences systematically alters the rank ordering. In many experimental stud-
ies when people evaluate a “P-bet” (a lottery that pays a modest amount with a high
probability) and a “$-bet” (a lottery that pays out a high amount with a small proba-
bility), people tend to choose the P-bet but report a higher WT A value for the $-bet
(see Cubitt et al. (2004) for a review of studies). This is problematic for standard
theory. For instance, Grether and Plott (1979) write:
Taken at face value the data are simply inconsistent with preference theory
and have broad implications about research priorities within economics. The
inconsistency is deeper than the mere lack of transitivity or even stochastic
transitivity. It suggests that no optimization principles of any sort lie behind
even the simplest of human choices. . .
Choice-valuation preference reversals such as commonly observed with the P-bet and
$-bet can be described using the framework from Section 1.
Definition 6 There is a choice-valuation preference reversal if there exist acts
r, rˆ, r˜, a, b, v, v ∈ A such that
EU(r, a) > EU(r, b)
but
EU(rˆ, a) = EU(rˆ, v)
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Table 3 Choice-valuation preference reversals
Measure State-by-state Koszegi-Rabin
P-bet $-bet P-bet $-bet
WTA $305.1 $478.2 $282.7 $284.6
EU(0, b) 157.8 153.6 157.8 153.6
The P-bet pays out 350 with probability 0.81 and zero otherwise. The $-bet pays out 1700 with probability
0.19 and zero otherwise. WTA is willingness to accept. EU(0, b) is the expected utility of the respective
lottery when initial wealth is zero. The figures are calculated using the utility function defined in Eq. 1
and
EU(r˜, b) = EU(r˜, v)
where for all s ∈ S, v(s) ≥ v(s) and for some s ∈ S, v(s) > v(s).
This definition can be applied to the P-bet/$-bet problem as follows. Act a repre-
sents the P-bet and act b the $-bet. Act v is the WT A for the P-bet and act v is the
WT A for the $-bet. Finally act r is the constant act that gives zero in every state, act
rˆ is the P-bet and act r˜ is the $-bet.
Table 3 shows WT A valuations and expected utility figures for a P-bet and a $-bet.
The P-bet pays 350 with probability 0.81; the $-bet pays out 1700 with probability,
0.19. The WT A valuation for the $-bet is higher, suggesting the $-bet is preferred.
The expected utility figure, however, is higher for the P-bet meaning that in a straight
choice, the P-bet is preferred. The preference inferred from the WT A valuations is
reversed.9
3 Generalization
The previous sections considered a utility function defined on income alone. This
section considers models where utility can depend on both initial wealth and income.
Theorem 1 For all expected utility of initial wealth and income models with utility
function ury ∈ Ury either (a) there are preference reversals or (b) preferences can
be represented using an expected utility of final wealth model with utility function
uw ∈ Uw.
Proof Let A be the set of all possible acts. Take any utility function ury ∈ Ury . Let
EUry be an expected utility of initial wealth and income model using utility function
ury . Take any pair of acts a, b ∈ A, and any initial wealth r ∈ A. From initial
9That choice-value preference reversals can occur in an expected utility model is not a new result. For
instance, Sugden (2003) shows how similar results occur in an expected utility model where utility is
defined on satisfaction and changes in satisfaction.
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wealth r, either (1) EUry(r, a) > EUry(r, b), (2) EUry(r, a) < EUry(r, b), or (3)
EUry(r, a) = EUry(r, b). Consider cases (1) and (2).
Case 1. If there is at least one framing induced preference reversal, then there
exists some rˆ ∈ A such that EUry(rˆ, a) ≤ EUry(rˆ, b). Conversely, if there are no
such preference reversals, then for all rˆ ∈ A, EUry(rˆ, a) > EUry(rˆ, b).
Case 2. If there is at least one framing induced preference reversal, then there
exists some rˆ ∈ A such that EUry(rˆ, a) ≥ EUry(rˆ, b). Conversely, if there are no
such preference reversals, then for all rˆ ∈ A, EUry(rˆ, a) < EUry(rˆ, b).
Now, assume there are no framing induced preference reversals with EUry for
all r, rˆ, a, b ∈ A. Let r0 ∈ A be the constant act the gives zero in all states. Since
there are no preference reversals, it follows that (1) EUry(r, a) < EUry(r, b) if and
only if EUry(r0, a) < EUry(r0, b) and (2) EUry(r, a) > EUry(r, b) if and only if
EUry(r0, a) > EUry(r0, b). From this it follows that if EUry(r, a) = EUry(r, b),
then neither (1) EUry(r0, a) < EUry(r0, b) nor (2) EUry(r0, a) > EUry(r0, b).
Hence, EUry(r, a) = EUry(r, b) if and only if EUry(r0, a) = EUry(r0, b).
Recall that
EUry(r0, a) =
∑
s∈S
p(s)ury(0, a(s)).
where ury : Dry → R. Since for all (0, x) ∈ Dry there exists x ∈ C, it follows that
for all ury ∈ Ury , there exists uw ∈ Uw such that for all x ∈ C, ury(0, x) = uw(x).
Hence, there exists uw ∈ Uw such that
∑
s∈S
p(s)ury(a(s), 0) =
∑
s∈S
p(s)uw(a(s)).
Hence, either there are preference reversals, or preferences can be captured by a
utility function defined on final wealth alone.
It is noteworthy that it has not been proved that all expected utility of income
models predict preference reversals.
Figure 1 is a Venn diagram showing the relations between expected utility mod-
els. Each point on the diagram is a preference relation over lotteries. There are
three sets labeled Rw, Ry , and Rry . The sets contain preference relations described
by expected utility models defined on (i) final wealth, (ii) income, and (iii) initial
wealth and income. The shaded areas represent empty zones. Let w denote final
wealth, r denote initial wealth, and y denote income. The points labeled a, b and c
represent different cases. It is easy to see that preferences represented by expected
utility of wealth models (point a) and by expected utility of income models (point
b) can also be represented by an initial wealth and income model by simply using
a utility function ury(r, y) ≡ uw(r + y) or ury(r, y) ≡ uy(y) respectively. More
interesting are the preferences represented by point c, which can be described by all
three classes of model. Such preferences can be described by an exponential utility
function such as u(x) = −e−x , which, as Pratt (1964) notes, imply the same risk
preferences at all levels of x. Such preferences exhibit constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA). Utility functions can be defined on income or final wealth without prefer-
ence reversals. Although CARA preferences have attractive features, many empirical
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Fig. 1 Relations between expected utility models. Rw is the set of preference relations described by
expected utility of wealth models. Ry is the set of preference relations described by expected utility of
income models. Rry is the set of preference relations described by expected utility of initial wealth and
income models. Shaded areas indicate empty zones
studies use a utility function exhibiting constant relative risk aversion.10 Such func-
tions allow a person’s preferences over risks to change with the assets they hold, so
as a consequence must be defined on final wealth if preference reversals are to be
avoided.
4 Implications for decision theory
This paper has shown that if income and wealth are separate arguments of utility, the
resulting model can predict anomalies that are inconsistent with the standard rational
model. But if income and wealth do not enter separately, then Rabin’s paradox applies
and risk aversion over modest stakes cannot be accommodated. Expected utility of
initial wealth and income models cannot accommodate risk aversion over modest
stakes without also accommodating preference reversals.
Empirical studies typically find risk aversion over modest stakes, which suggests
we should take seriously the possibility of preference reversals occurring. There are
several important open questions. If preferences are reference dependent, how is the
10See Wakker (2008) for a discussion of the characteristics of such functions.
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reference point determined and what dynamic inconsistencies does this cause? Do
people anticipate dynamic inconsistencies in their own behavior (for example as in
the dual self model of Fudenberg and Levine (2006)), and if so, how do they react?
Do people anticipate dynamic inconsistency in the behavior of others and what are
the consequences for strategic interaction?
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